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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEE ~I. HOUSLEY awl
REESE C. HOUSLEY,
Plaintiffs-APPELLAS'I'S,
vs.
THE ANACONDA CO.MPANY, a
corporation, and DENN IS P. COX,
Defendants,
and

No.
10612

THE TRA YELERS INSURANCE
COlVIPANY, a corporation,
Garnishee,
RESPONDENTS.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and automobile damages arising out of a two-vehicle collision
wherein plaintiffs have jointly sued The Anaconda
Company and Dennis P. Cox, an employee of Anal

conda, who was driving a company vehicle at the time
it struck the vehicle of plaintiffs; and to proceed against
Cox, who left the State of Utah shortly after the accident, by garnishment proceedings against an insurance
policy with The Travelers Insurance Company as the
liability insurer of both Anaconda and Cox.
DISPOSITION IN LU\VER COURT
Four different judges of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County have made and entered
various Orders in this matter involving(a) A ruling that defendant Cox, who left the
State of Utah shortly after the accident, had
not made a general appearance in certain proceedings relating to plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend their Complaint;
(b) The quashing of service of summons in an
in rem proceeding brought by serving defendant Cox in the State of Maryland, and
the joining of The Travelers Insurance Company, as garnishee therein;
( c) The granting of summary judgment in favor
of defendant Anaconda Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the applicable Orders
entered in this action establishing, m the alternative
2

as to Cox, either that defendant Cox made a general
appearance in this matter or that the liability policy
of insurance issued by The Travelers Insurance Company insuring both The Anaconda Company and Dennis P. Cox can be reached as a chose in action so that
the lower court can proceed with the trial of this case
in an in rem proceeding notwithstanding the absence
of Cox from the State of Utah. As to The Anaconda
Company, plaintiffs seek a reversal and setting aside
of the Order granting summary judgment in favor of
that defendant, and that the matter be sent back to the
lower court for a trial on the merits of the action as
to The Anaconda Company.

STATE1"1ENT OF FACTS
On January 5, 1959, in Salt Lake City, defendant
Cox, while driving a motor vehicle owned by The Anaconda Company, and with its express permission (R.
133) , drove into the rear of an automobile being driven
by plaintiff Shirlee .M. Housley, and owned by plaintiff
Reese C. Housley (R. 1).
Plaintiff Shirlee M. Housley suffered severe back
and neck injuries. Ruptured discs of the lower back
have required fusion of that area of the spine and a
further fusion is contemplated in the cervical spine. A
female operation to prevent future childbirth has been
performed as necessary treatment to prevent further
aggravation of her spinal injuries (R. 18).
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Her expenditures to date for hospitalization and
medical expenses, therapeutic devices, drugs and medicines, and nursing care, are in excess of $6,000.00. She
is faced with partial permanent disability and continuing
pain and suffering.
'Vithin a few weeks after the accident defendant
Cox departed the State of Utah and went to Brazil.
Subsequently, he returned to the States, and now resides in Maryland.
'Vithin eight months after the collision (R. 3)
plaintiffs caused a Complaint to be filed, and service
of summons was made upon The Anaconda Company.
However, inasmuch as defendant Cox had left the State
of Utah approximately six weeks after the accident
(Exh. 2-P-#24), personal service could not be made
upon Cox. On November 6, 1963, pursuant to a motion
made by plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint setting forth allegations justifying a proceeding against
defendant Cox in an in rem count (R. 16-19), counsel
for Cox appeared at the hearing (R. 165-168) and
informed the court that he was appearing as Cox's
attorney" ... for the purpose of this amendment ... ",
and further informed the court that he wished to argue
that plaintiffs " . . . cannot state a cause of action
against Mr. Cox." Thereupon, after several hearings
and the submission of briefs, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson
ruled on May 19, 1964 that in rem jurisdiction could
be had in Utah to try the matter against Cox by reaching the liability insurance policy insuring Cox, and that
4

the appearance in the matter by Cox, through his
attorney, was not a general appearance " ... since the
aforesaid ruling of the court that in rem jurisdiction
can be had herein is considered by the Court to be a
special appearance." (R. 61).
N otwithstandnig the Order of Judge Jeppson,
when personal service was actually made upon Cox in
the State of _Maryland reciting the in rem nature of
the proceeding and other incidents of the relief sought,
counsel for Cox again appeared, and after one unsuccessful attempt before Judge Aldon J. Anderson
(R. 62-63), finally induced the latter, upon a re-hearing, to issue an Order quashing summons (R. 82) on
July 7, 1964. The last Order was apparently based
upon what counsel for Cox asserted to be constitutional
objections under Section 7 of Article I of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in that Cox was being deprived " . . . of his property without due process of
law
"
On December 13, 1965, a pre-trial hearing was
had before Judge Stewart M. Hanson and a pre-trial
Order was prepared setting the matter for trial as to
defendant Anaconda Company (R. 131-133). Thereafter, and prior to trial date, defendant Anaconda
Company, appearing through the same counsel who
represented Cox, moved for Summary Judgment, supported by the Affidavit ( R. 134) of defendant Cox,
wherein the issue was raised as to whether Cox was

5

within the scope of employment of Anaconda Company
at the time of the accident. The affidavit of Cox recite<l
that at the time of the accident " ... I was on my way
home to have lunch with my wife." He further stated
that "I cannot now recall whether I was going to pick
up equipment after lunch on the day of the accident."
Based upon the record before the Court at the time,
together with the Afficfavit of Cox, Judge Merrill C.
Faux entered an Order granting Summary Judgment
in favor of Anaconda Company on March 16, 1966
(R. 160).
ARGUMENT
This Appeal is taken and based upon the following
points:
I. IN REM JURISDICTION CAN BE HAD
IN UTAH BY GARNISHMENT OF AN INSURANCE POLICY AS A CHOSE IN ACTION
SO AS TO GIVE UTAH COURTS JURISDICTION TO PROCEED IN A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION WHERE THE DEFENDANT
HAS DEPARTED THE STATE OF UTAH
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE
BEFORE JUDGE JEPPSON ON NOV. 6, 1963,
WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION.
III. THE ORDER GRANTING SU.MMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

6

ANACONDA COl\IPANY IS UNSUPPORTABLE UNDER THE FACTS AND THE RECORD BEI<'ORE THE COURT.
POINT I
IN REM_ JURISDICTION CAN BE HAD
IN UTAH BY GARNISHl\:IENT OF AN INSURANCE POLICY AS A CHOSE IN ACTIOX
SO AS TO GIVE UTAH COURTS JURISDICTION TO PROCEED IN A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION 'VHERE THE DEFENDANT
IIAS DEPARTED THE STATE OF UTAH
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE.
The facts of this case concerning jurisdiction create
a somewhat unusual situation-but one which undoubtedly will occur more and more frequently with the
mobile population which faces the American future.
At the time of the accident the defendant, Dennis P.
Cox, was apparently a resident of the State of Utah.
Shortly after the accident Mr. Cox left Utah for Brazil,
making it difficult to obtain in personam jurisdiction.
This has created an anomalous and ironical situation
since Utah's long arm statute, U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 41-128, has been held in 'l'eague v. District Court, 4 Utah 2d
147, 289 P.2d 331, and Brandon v. Teague, 5 Utah
2d 214, 299 P. 2d 1113 (1956), to apply only to those
persons who were nonresidents at the time of the injury.
Thus, by leaving the State of Utah a resident can avoid
jurisdiction over his person, whereas a nonresident is
subject to substituted service.

7

Basically, what the plaintiff seeks to do in this
case is to obtain in rem jurisdiction by garnishment
of a chose in action belonging to the defendant. This
action does not contemplate acquiring in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant, nor does it contemplate
any form of direct action against the liability insurer.
The plaintiff merely intends to impose a lien upon a
chose in action in the hands of a third party and to use
such lien as a basis for in rem jurisdiction. Any recovery
by the plaintiff will be limited to the value of the
attached chose in action.
This procedure is authorized by U.C.A. 1953,
Rule 64 D. Rule 64 D specifically provides for garnishment prior to judgment. Further, an attachment
or garnishment with constructive service gives jurisdiction to proceed in the main action against property
of the defendant. Bristol v. Brent, 35 Utah 213, 99 P.
1000.

The United States Supreme Court has sanctioned
this procedure whereby constructive service can be used
to obtain in rem jurisdiction, allowing the plaintiff to
proceed in the main action against property of the
defendant in the hands of a third party. Chicago R.R.
Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 S. Ct. 797 (1899);
Harri,s v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625 (1905).
This procedure is not prohibited by Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877), since that case
merely prohibits the use of constructive service in obtaining in personam jurisdiction.
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The conflict on this point initially arose when the
plaintiff filed a "Notice and Motion for .Filing Amended Complaint" ( R. 15-23). By this motion the plaintiff
sought to amend the complaint to contain an in rem
count against a chose in action belonging to the defendant, Cox, and being held by The Travelers Insurance
Company. The defendant, Cox, made an appearance
to object to this amendment (R. 165-169). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' motion was granted by J udgc
Joseph G. Jeppson in the following language ( R. 6061) :

"NO,V, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
I. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has a chose in
action under a liability insurance policy which
can be reached by plaintiffs to acquire in rem
jurisdiction in these proceedings, and plaintiffs'
motion to amend their complaint accordingly is
hereby granted and garnishment may issue as
requested."

This final Order dated l\'Iay 19, 1964, followed
Judge J eppson's .Minute Entry dated December 5,
1963, which gave initial approval to the amendment
and the in rem action (R. 121). In the interim, however, process was constructively served upon the defendant, Cox, in the State of Maryland (R. 27). Thus, in
rem jurisdiction had been established prior to Judge
J eppson's final Order (R. 121).
Being unable to obtain a reversal from Judge
Jeppson, defendant Cox, through his attorney, pre9

sented the matter to a different judge. In an Order,
dated May 25, 1964, (R. 62-63), Judge Anderson
denied defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint and to quash the service of summons, saying
that the
" . . . Order of Judge Jeppson had disposed
of the legal and factual issues material to the
1\-lotion before the Court, and to grant the :Motion to Dismiss to Quash Summons at this time
would require a reversal of the prior Order in
the matter involving the same matters of law
and fact; . . . "
Nevertheless, the persistent defendant obtained an
"Order Granting Motion to Quash Summons" (R.
82) by a second appeal to Judge Anderson on July 7,
1964. By Judge Anderson's own language (R. 62-63)
he thereby reversed the prior Order issued at the hand
of Judge Jeppson.
In resolving this question, which has been framed
by the respective judges and also in the interpretation
of cited cases, it is crucial that the statutory language
be closely consulted. This was made clear in 134 A.L.R.
853, 854 ( 1941), where the annotation reads:
"The remedy of garnishment or attachment
is in derogation of the common law and exists
only by virtue of statute. 4 Am. Jur. 555, Attachment and Garnishment, Sec. 8.
"There appears to be a garnishment act or
statute, or an act or statute relating to a similar
process, in practically every jurisdiction, though
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in so.me states the statute does not specifically
provide that to make an obligation not due or
not payable, garnishable, its payment must not
depend upon a contingency.
"However, it is laid down as a general rule by
text writers that a debt which is contingent, and
may never become due and payable, is not subject to garnishment, is stated in Hanover F. Ins.
Co. v. Connor (1886) 20 Ill. App. 297.
"Sometimes and in some jurisdictions the
statute has apparently permitted the garnishment of contingent obligations, and in that case,
of course, the question under annotation does
not arise."
This same state of the law was expressed m 47
)farq. L. Rev. 221, 222 (1963).
"In the absence of statutes to the contrary, a
debt which is uncertain and contingent, in the
sense that it may never become due and payable,
is not subject to garnishment. Only a few states
have by statute provided for the garnishment
of contingent interests." (Emphasis added).
It is submitted that Utah is one of those states
allowing garnishment of contingent interests. Cases not
so allowing garnishment of contingent interests can
be explained on the basis of the applicable state statute.
134 A.L.R. 853 ( 1941), discusses Banionis v. Lake,
289 .l\Iass. 146, 193 N. E. 731 (1935), where an obli-

gation under a settlement agreement to pay upon release
was held contingent and not garnishable " (a) Under
a statute making a debt subject to the trustee process
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if its payment does not depend upon any contingency
"
In Gray v. Houck, 68 S. W. 2d 117, 167 Tenn.
233 (1934), the Tennessee Supreme Court held against
the plaintiff on facts similar to those in the case at bar.
However, that decision was necessitated by the Code
of Tennessee, 1932:
23-601 ( 9396)

Grounds for Attachment - Any person having
a debt or demand due at the commencement of
an action, or a plaintiff after action for any cause
has been brought, and either before or after
judgment, may sue out of an attachment at law
or in equity, against the property of a debtor
or defendant, in the following cases:
( 1) Where the debtor or defendant resides
out of the state
23-603 ( 9400)

Debts not due - An attachment may in like
manner, be sued out upon debts or demands not
due, in any cases mentioned in 23-601, except
the first; that is, when the debtor resides out of
the state. (Italics added).
23-701 ( 9428)

A.ssets subject to garnishment. - Where property, choses in action, or effects of the debtor are
in the hands of third persons, or third persons
are indebted to such debtor, the attachment may
be by garnishment.
An analysis of the three quoted statutory provisions shows that garnishment proceedings are tied to
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attachment proceedings, and that a limitation prohibited attachment or garnishment upon a debts or demands not due ... to hen the debtor or defendant resides
out of the state."
60 A.L.R. 884, 885 ( 1929), discusses the garnish-

ability of notes or accounts in the possession of a third
party for collection. On this issue the courts split, but
in referring to a decision holding that a note was not
garnishable from a custodian the annotator said:
"The reason for the decision was that a mere
custodian of choses in action who has received
no money upon them is not liable to an attachment in execution, as he is in no sense a debtor
to the defendant in the execution."
It is obvious that the applicable statute in that case
did not allow attachment or garnishment of a chose
m action.

However, the applicable Utah statute, U.C.A.
1953, Rule 64 D, does provide for the garnishment of
a chose in action.

(a) When plaintiff entitled to writ; affidavitThe plaintiff, at any time after the filing of
the complaint, may have a writ of garnishment
issue, and attach the credits, effects, debts, choses
in action, money, and other personal property of
the defendant in the possession or in the control
of any third person, as garnishee, whether the
same are dne rd the time of the service of the
writ or are to become due thereafter, . . . "
( I tali cs added) .
13

The exact scope of this statute has not been delineated by this Court, but a comparison of the statutes of
sister states will soon show that the Utah statute is
indeed broad. The Utah statute expressly allows garnishment of a chose in action to become due after service
of the writ.
That an insurance policy is a species of property
in the nature of a chose in action, susceptible of ownership like any other chose in action, there can be no
doubt. 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sec. 186; Black, Law
Dictionary (3rd ed. 1933); Thompson Heating Corp.
v. Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co. of Minn., 72 Ohio
App. 55, 50 N.E. 2d 671, 673; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
441, 447, 12 L. Ed. 1147. The defendant has even so
much as admitted this in his pleadings (R. 64, 71),
where he erroneously cited Pennoyer v. Neff for the
proposition "that a denial of his motion to dismiss and
quash summons will deprive him of his property without
due process of law." It was upon that motion that
Judge Anderson acted in the quashing of summons
(R. 82).
The case of Acheson-Harder Co. v. Western
Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 P. 1032, 60
A.L.R. 881 ( 1928), is appropriate to point out the
significance of the allowance of garnishment of a chose
in action to become due after service of the writ. In that
case this Court held that accounts placed in the hands
of the garnishee for collection, but not collected, could
not be reached by the service of a writ of garnishment
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upon the person having such accounts in his hands
for collecton. This Court held that the liability of the
garnishee to account to the defendant for property
or indebtedness must be absolute, in order that such
property or indebtedness be garnishable. The then
existing statute, Laws of Utah 1925, C. 106, required
that the garnishee have
"property, money, goods, chattels, credits or
effects in his, or its hands or under his or its control belonging to the defendant or defendants,
or any or either of them, or that such person
or persons, firm or corporation is indebted to
the defendant; that the defendant is indebted
to him or it on such contract, judgment or decree,
sued upon, ... " (Emphasis added).
The present statute has obviously liberalized garnishment proceedings by adding chose in action, by
including language to the effect that the asset need
not be due, and by deleting the reference to such contract, judgment or decree sued upon. By definition
alone, a chose in action does not mean absolute indebtedness. Sheldon v. Sill, supra; United States v. J. T.
Hubbell, 323 F. 2d 197 (5th Cir. 1963).
Furthermore, the Acheson Case can be clistinguished on the basis that the obligation was contingent
qua contingent since the garnishee himself had an act
to perform to determine his liability. In other words
the bO'arnishee could have effectively• blocked the garnishment by not making the collection. In the case at
bar all facts which would make the garnishee liable
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have occurred; the garnishee himself cannot, by action
or inaction, prevent his liability to the defendant.
At this point it should be made clear that the plaintiff is not engaged in a direct action against The
Travelers Insurance Company. Such a procedure has
not been permitted by Utah law. Rule 64 D merely
permits the imposition of a garnishment lien as a basis
for in rem jurisdiction whereby the plaintiff can proceed
in the main action against property of the defendant.
This proceeding, in contrast to a direct actiou
(personal), is not prohibited by the insurance contract
between defendant and garnishee. The contract does
contain a "no action" clause in the following words:
CONDITIONS
13. Action Against CompanyN o action shall lie against the company unless,
as a condition precedent thereto, the insured
shall have fully complied with all the terms of
this policy, nor until the amount of the insured's
obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured
after actual trial or by written agreement of the
insured, the claimant and the company. (Emphasis added) .
This action is not"against the company" but rather
against Cox, by reaching a liability insurance contract
between him and the insurance company. This distinction was made clear by a prominent Utah defense
attorney, Ray R. Christensen, Direct Rights and Reme-
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dies Against Liability Insurers, 28 Utah llar Bull. 155
( 1958), where he said:
"Under the provisions of Rule 64 D, the writ
of garnishment apparentcy will lie before judgment is obtained against the insured. However,
it would serve a useful purpose only in rare cases
such as suggested under paragraph A. above."
The distinction between a tort claim and a contract
claim is necessitated under Utah law. Plaintiffs are
not attaching an unliquidated tort claim, which is the
nature of the chose in action which they have; rather,
they are proceeding against a contractural right which
defendant Cox has against The Travelers Insurance
Company to have the latter pay damages on his behalf
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.
That an unliquidated tort claim could not be garnished under Rule 64 D was held by this Court in
Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376, 380
(1957). In that case the plaintiff obtained a $20,000.00
personal judgment against the defendant. The insurance company, garnishee, paid to its maximum liability
of $10,000.00. The plaintiff claimed that the garnishee
was negligent in not making a settlement, and that
therefore the garnishee was liable to the defendant in
tort. The plaintiff attempted to label this tort claim as
a chose in action under Rule 64 D, and garnished same.
This court held that an unliquidated tort claim
was not a chose in action within Rule 64 D. In this
respect this Court specifically referred to the claim of
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defendant against garnishee and not the claim of plaintiff against defendant. This Court's determination was
necessitated by the language of Rule 64 D (m) where
it indicates that the garnishee may set off any debt
owed him against defendant, but is liable for the balance
"not including 1tnliquidated damages for wrongs and
injuries."
By way of dicta this Court went one step further
and assumed that an unliquidated tort claim was a chose
in action.
"Let it be assumed that the facts alleged in
plaintiffs' second reply to defendant's answer
show the existence of a chose in action in favor
of Kirkendall and against garnishee which would
support a judgment against garnishee which we
do not here decide, nevertheless we are of the
opinion that that chose in action must be processed by defendants' instituting an action in
court against the garnishee where all rights and
issues may be determined in the garnishment
proceedings.''
The Court would here appear to be reading into
the statute a requirement that the chose in action or
claim of defendant against garnishee be absolute, liquidated and not contingent. It is respectfully submitted
that no language of Rule 64 D so infers and that a chose
in action, by definition, is unliquidated and uncertain.
In Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U. S. 411, 447, 12 L. Ed. 1147,
"A chose in action is a thing in action, a right
of action, a thing recoverable in action, a debt,
a demand, a promissory note, a right to recover
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dama&'es. A chos~ in action was originally a right
of action not assignable at law. It was a cause
of suit for a debt due or a wrong done."
Surely a demand implies no certainty, nor does
a right of action. In First Nat. Bank v. FI olland, 39
S. E. 126, 129, 99 Va. 495, 55 L.R.A. 155, 86 Am. St.
Rep. 898, Kent's definition of a chose in action is
quoted.
"A 'chose in action' is defined by Kent (2
Kent's Comm. pt. 5, p. 351) as a personal right
not reduced to possession, but recoverable bv a
suit at law. Money due on bond, note or o{her
contract, damages due for the breach of contract
for the detention of chattels, or for torts, as
included under this general head or title of things
in action. A chose in action is a mere right of
action due, a personal chattel not in actual pos. "
session.
Again, it is submitted that Utah is one of the states
referred to in Annot., 134 A.L.R. 853 ( 1941), and
47 Marq. L. Rev. 221 ( 1963), which allows garnishment of contingent obligations. Nevertheless, it is also
submitted that the chose in action which the plaintiffs
seek to attach is not contingent.
In J(nudson v. Anderson, 199 .Minn. 479, 272 N.
,V, 379 (1937), a judgment was obtained against the
defendant in a suit arising out of an automobile accident.
The insurance company denied liability upon the basis
that ownership of the offending car was in another.
The injured plaintiff then garnished the insurance
company. The Minnesota statute, Mason's Minn. Stat.
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1927, Sec. 9361, being much more strict than Utah's

Rule 64 D, provided:

"No person or corporation shall be adjudged
a garnishee in any of the following cases:

( l) By reason of any money or other thing
due to the defendant, unless at the time of the
service of the sumons the same is due absolutely,
and without depending on any contingency."
In answering the question as to whether the establishment of the fact of ownership created a contingency
within the meaning of Sec. 9361, the Court said:
"It is not contemplated that the garnishee
shall interest himself for the protection of his
creditor, who is the defendant in the original
action; nor should the statute be so construed
as to enable the garnishee to assist his creditor.

*

*

*

"The contingency must affect the actual liability of the garnishee and be such as may prevent defendant from having any claim whatever
against the garnishee or right to call him to an
accounting, and not merely the title to the property in possession of the garnishee, or his liability,
the force and effect of which may be in dispute
between defendant and garnishee.
"Litigation is often, if not always, uncertain
as to ultimate result. But that uncertainty after
all is dependent upon establishment of the facts.
When these are established, the uncertainty no
longer exists. We think the uncertainty or 'contingency' ref erred to in the statute is such as is
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inherent in the obligation itself, not the uncertainty of what litigation may establish as
facts."
In the case at bar all facts which would establish
liability of the garnishee to the defendant have occurred;
hence, there is no contingency in the legal sense. The
only uncertainty is the establishment of these facts in
a court of law; the plaintiffs merely seek that opportunity.
The nature of the insurance contract and the Utah
Safety Responsibility Act both contribute toward making the liability of The Travelers Insurance Company
to defendant, Cox, more certain. In this respect the
insurance contract in force between defendant and
garnishee is one of liability insurance, rather than of
indemnity insurance. Thus, payment need not be made
by the defendant before the insurance company's liability becomes certain. The only uncertainty remaining
is the uncertainty which the plaintiffs seek to resolve
m this case.
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act also contributes toward making the liability of The Travelers
Insurance Company to defendant, Cox, more certain.
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 41-12-21 (f) (1) and (2) provide:
" (f) Every motor vehicle liability policy shall
be subject to the following provisions which need
not be contained therein:
( 1) The liability of the insurance carrier with
respect to the insurance required by this act
shall become absolute whenever injury or
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damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be
canceled or annulled as to such liability by
any agreement between the insurance carrier and insured after the occurrence of the
injury or damage; no statement made by
the insured or on his behalf and no violation
of said policy shall defeat or void said policy.
(2) The satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or damage shall not
be a condition precedent to the right or duty
of the insurance carrier to make payment
on account of such injury or damages; ... "
As indicated by the defendant (R. 96), "The language "the liability of the insurance carrier with respect
to the insurance required by this act shall become absolue" means that the Insurance Company cannot cancel
the policy or attempt to escape its obligation under the
policy." Thus the insurance company can bring up no
side defenses to disclaim liability to the defendant.
Upon the occurrence of the accident all facts needed
to establish liability have occurred; no contingency
exists.
Additional authority for this point is United States
v. J. T. Hubbell, 323 F. 2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1963).
In that case a United States tax lien was held to attach
to an unliquidated tort claim pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A.,
Sec. 3670, which imposed "A lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal ... " Suit had not been commenced
upon the tort claim at the time the lien attached. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
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"Lewis' claim against Housing Authority was
not contingent merely because it would take a
lawsuit to reduce it to judgment or to collect it.
It was, perhaps uncertain, but not subject to
any infirmity which would prevent the attachment of a lien. The real issue in this case, the
unprecedented one, is whether the lien attaches
to an unliquidated claim sounding in tort.Neither
party cites us to a case directly in point, and
we have found none. We see no reason, however, why a tort claim is not 'property' or 'rights
to property', just as, e.g., any unliquidated contract claim is so considered."
If a federal tax lien can attach to an unliquidated
tort claim pursuant to a statute in terms of "property
and rights to property" then, a fortiori, a garnishment
lien can attach to an unliquidated contract claim pursuant to a statute in terms of "personal property" and
"choses in action".

The case of Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. 2d 541, 543
(8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 628, 72 L. Ed.
739, 48 S. Ct. 321 ( 1928), is conclusive authority in
favor of the plaintiffs on the iss'ue before this Court.
In that case, the garnishee, Fidelity and Casualty Company, insured defendant, Singer, against interior office
robbery. Singer submitted a claim on February 4, 1924.
The Fidelity and Casualty Company disputed Singer's
claim, and while the matter was in dispute, on March
10, 1924, creditors of the defendant filed an attachrnent suit in New York and a warrant of attachment
was issued thereon. On March 11, 1924, service of
garnishment was had on the F'idelity and Casualty
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Company of New York. On April l, 1924, constructive service was had by Singer in St. Louis. On April
7, 1924, Singer began action against Fidelity & Casualty Company; this suit was subsequently removed to
a federal district court. The last judgment obtained
by any creditor was August 23, 1924, while the consent
judgment of Singer against Fidelity and Casualty
Company was not rendered until December 17, 1924.
The :Fidelity and Casualty Company filed a bill
of interpleader in which the trustee in bankruptcy
attacked the attachment liens on the ground that the
New York court did not have jurisdiction of the res,
because the insurance claim was an unliquidated cause
of action upon a contract, and, being such, was not
garnishable under the New York statute; that it was
not garnishable because the claim was unliquidated,
and that there was a genuine dispute as to the liability
of the Fidelity & Casualty Company to Singer.
In holding the garnishment of the unliquidate
contract clai mto be valid the Court said:
"The fact that the attachment is issued before
the debt is conclusively established on which it
is founded, and it may subsequently be shown
by the defendant in the attachment that there
was no such debt, is not a sufficient reason for
holding that the attaching creditor cannot show
that the property attached is in fact the debtor's.

*

*

*

"The contingency which will prevent garnishment is not presented by the mere fact of denial
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by the garnishee of the obligation. The uncertainty contemplated by the law is one that conditions the obligation, rendering it uncertain in
the sense that it may never become due or owing,
the determination of that being contingent upon
the happening of some future event.
"The court may take evidence and determine
what the truth is as to whether or not the event
determining the liability has or has not happened,
and the mere denial of the indebtedness by the
garnishee does not prevent garnishment."
The only distinction between Ackerman v. Tobin
and the case at bar is that in the former there was uncertainty as to the liability of defendant to plaintiff
and also of the liability of garnishee to defendant;
whereas, in the latter the only uncertainty concerns
the liability of defendant to plaintiff. It is this uncertainty which the plaintiffs seek to resolve by establishing in rem jurisdiction allowing them to proceed
in the main action against property of the defendant
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Since Judge Jeppson ruled that in rem jurisdiction could be had by reaching a chose in action under
the liability insurance policy and "that garnishment
may issue as requested", it is submitted that the Order
quashing service of summons was improperly entered
and should be set aside so that proceedings can coutinue
m rem.
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POINT TWO
THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAHANCE
BEFORE JUDGE JEPPSON ON NOV. 6, 1963,
\V AIVED HIS OBJECTION TO PERSON AL
JURISDICTION.
On October 22, 1963, the plaintiffs filed a "Notice
and Motion for filing Amended Complaint" (R. 1523) . This amendment sought to add an in rem count
to the complaint so as to garnish an insurance policy
as a chose in action. Prior to this time, and prior to
the hearing, no personal jurisdiction had been acquired
over defendant, Dennis P. Cox, since no summons
could be served under the applicable sfatutes. This
motion was heard on November 6, 1963 ( R. 165-169).
At the hearing, and before any jurisdiction had
been acquired, the defendant, represented by his attorney, made an appearance. That the attorney, Mr.
Nebeker, represented the defendant, Cox, is subject
to no doubt, as evidenced by the Reporter's Transcript
(R. 165-169). Judge Jeppson, realizing that Cox could
well be making a general appearance, closely questioned
~Ir. Nebeker (R. 166) :
THE COURT: Do you not represent Mr.
Cox?
lVIR. NEBEKER: \:Ve are appearing especially for that purpose, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You do not represent .Mr.
Cox?
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. l\;IR. N_EBEKER: For the purpose of resisting this amendment, Yes. No jurisdiction
over .Mr. Cox, that is the problem.
THE COURT: Are you Mr. Cox's attorney!
You did not so state.
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, I would represent
here we are representing him for the purpose
of this amendment.
The sanie transcript also sheds light upon the reason for the appearance by defendant, Cox (R. 165):
THE COURT: This motion is to amend as
to Mr. Cox, is it not?
MR. FULLER: Essentially as to Mr. Cox,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have any objection
to that?
MR. NEBEKER: We would object to that
-appearing especially for that purpose, yes.
Here Mr. Nebeker expressly said that he was
appearing especially to object to the motion to amend
as to Mr. Cox. The defendant further stipulates (R.
100) : "It is undisputed that the only motion before
Judge Jeppson was plaintiffs'· motion to amend their
complaint."
In objecting to the motion to amend the complaint,
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs could not state
a cause of action against ~Ir. Cox (R. 166):
THE COURT: Do you want to argue he
cannot state a cause of action against Mr. Cox?
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, Your Honor.
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On December 5, 1963, Judge Jeppson made a
minute entry (R. 121), which was finalized by Order
of ~fay 19, 1964 (R. 60-61). As applicable to this issue,
that Order read (R. 61):
2. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has made a special appearance herein challenging personal
jurisdiction over his person, and that such appearance did not constitute a general appearance
since the aforesaid ruling of the Court that in
rem jurisdiction can be had therein is considered
by the Court to be a special appearance.

From the foregoing Order it can be seen that Judge
J eppson's ruling as to the nature of the appearance
was tied to the question of in rem jurisdiction. If the
objection went to jurisdiction over the matter in an
in rem action, then the appearance would be considered
as special under the majority rule. 129 A.L.R. 1240.
This is apparently the way Judge Jeppson so considered the case. However, if it is considered that in
rem jurisdiction cannot be obtained or that the matter
before the Court, being merely a motion for filing an
amended complaint in a personal action, had no indicia
of an in rem action, then the appearance would be one
which would waive any objection to personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs here contend that the defendant
made an appearance, without objecting to jurisdiction
over his person, at a hearing wherein the complaint
was personal and the hearing had no indicia of an in
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rem action, and by so doing waived his objection to
personal jurisdiction.
The determination of this issue involves an interpretation of U.C.A. 1953, Rule 12. This rule is substantially identical to the federal rule. The federal rule
was interpreted in Orange Theatre Corporation v. Rayherstz Amusement Corporation, 139 F. 2d 871, 874
(3rd Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 740, 88 L. Ed.
1.573, 64 S. Ct. 1057, in the following words:
"It necessarily follows that Rule 12 has abolished for the federal courts the age-old distinction between general and special appearances.
A defendant need no longer appear specially to
attack the court's jurisdiction over him. He is
no longer required at the door of the federal
courthouse to intone that ancient abracadabra
of the law, de bene esse, in order by its magic
power to enable himself to remain outside even
while he steps within. He may now enter openly
in full confidence that he will not thereby be
giving up any keys to the courthouse door which
he possessed before he came in. This, of course,
is not to say that such keys must not be used
promptly. If the defense of lack of jurisdiction
of the person is not raised by motion before
answer or in the answer itself it is by the express
terms of pargaraph (h) of Civil Procedure
Rule 12 to be treated as waived, not because of
the defendant's voluntary appearance but because of his failure to assert the defense within
the time prescribed by the rules."

The language in the Orange Theatre Case, which
indicates that the distinction between general and spe-
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cial appearances has been completely abolished, cannot
be taken literally. It is true, however, that the emphasis
has been changed. 'Vhere formerly a defendant coulcl
not object to jurisdiction over his person, and being
overruled, plead to the merits without waiving his
objection to personal jurisdiction, a defendant can
now join his defense to personal jurisdiction with other
defenses without affecting a waiver. IIence, the distinction between a general appearance, one where the
defendant appears without having first objected to
jurisdiction over his person, and a special appearance,
one where the defendant objects to, inter alia, jurisdiction over his person, is still a viable one. United
States v. Onan, 190 F. 2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951) cert.
denied, 72 S. Ct. 112, 342 U. S. 869; Savas v. Maria
Trading Corp., 285 1'-.. 2d 336 (4th Cir. 1960); Graff
v. Nieberg, 233 F. 2d 860 (7th Cir. 1956); Barreiro
v. McGrath, 108 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Calif. 1952),
rnodified, Barreiro v. Brownell, 215 F. 2d 585 (9th
C~r.), cert. denied, 75 S. Ct. 207, 348 U. S. 887; United
States v. Balanovski, 230 F. 2d 298 (2nd Cir. 1956);
Hasse v. Arnerican Photograph Corp., 299 F. 2d 666
(10th Cir. 1962).
Because of this change in emphasis many courts
speak in terms of waiver by nonjoinder instead of
waiver by joinder or by general appearance. This
position is stated very clearly in the following quotation
from 16 Cal. State Bar Journal 152, which is incorporated under the Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
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"The new federal Rules do not in terms abolish
the "special appearance", but have this effect.
. . . : If a pa~ty so desires, he can make a prehmmary motion solely on the grounds of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, venue,
or process Rule 12 (g) ; but he need not do so,
and waives nothing by ma.king such objections
to the answer. . . . On the other hand, if the
objecting party does not raise all of these dilatory defenses (except, of course, jurisdiction of
the subject matter) in any motion he may make,
or in the answer if he has made no motion, he
does waive Rule 12 (g) and (h). So while the
form of the old "special appearance" is preserved in the preliminary motion under Rule
12 ( g) , in substance the preliminary motion is
a matter of convenience, not of necessity, and the
formula has been reversed. Where formerly
joinder might mean waiver non-joinder is likely
to create a waiver." (Emphasis added).
Similar explanations can be found in Allen B.

DuMont Laboratories, Inc. v. Marcolus Manufactur-

ing Co., Inc., 30 N. J. 290, 152 A. 2d 841, 847 (1959),

and in 15 U. l\!Iiami L. Rev. 269, 272.
The applicable statute, U.C.A. 1953, Subdiv. 12
(g), reads:
"(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who
makes a motion under this rule may join with it
the other motions herein provided for and then
available to him. If a party makes a motion under
this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available to him which this
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall
not thereafter make a motion based on any of
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the defenses or objections so omitted, except as
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
Subdivision ( h) makes no exception for objections
to jurisdiction over the person.
ln applying this statute to the ease at bar it should
be kept in mind that the defendant, Cox, appeared
from nowhere to object to a motion for filing an amended complaint. No prosess had been served upon him.
In making his objection or counter-motion he did not
"include therein all defenses and objections then available to him" i.e., the objection to jurisdiction over his
person.
Under the new procedural rules the timeliness of
any motion is crucial. The jurisdictional objection must
be made in the first instance or on the first appearance
to prevent a waiver by nonjoinder. This point has
been made clear in a multitude of cases. The Aquia,
72 F. Supp. 201 (E.D.S.C. 1947); McLaughlin v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Ry. Co.,
23 Wis. 2d 592, 127 N. W. 2d 813 ( 1964) ; In re Industrial Associates, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 866 (E. D. Pa.
1957) ; Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company, Inc., 409
Pa. 338, 186 A. 2d 396, 398 ( 1962).
In the latter case the court held that the defendant
had made a "general" appearance even though he had
previously filed a motion to quash the service of process
and to dismiss the action, but had not appealed the
adverse ruling or subsequently joined the jurisdictional
objection. The Court said:
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. ".When t~e ~efendant filed the original prehmmary ob.Jections to this case, which objected
only to the substance and form of the complaint,
a.nd no:ie of ~hich raised a jurisdictional question, this constituted a general appearance in the
action.''
The question next arising is what constitutes an
appearance sufficient to affect a waiver. The cases
and authorities are in clear agreement that an uncompelled appearance whereby the defendant resists the
cause of action without objecting to personal jurisdiction is sufficient to affect a waiver. Hadden v. Rumsey Products, 96 F. Supp. 988 ('V. D. N. Y. 1951);
Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F'. Supp. 872 (W.D.
Pa. 1961); 5 Am. Jur. 2d; Appearance, Sec. 16; U.S.
v. Hoerner, 157 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mont. 1957).
In the latter case the court said on page 567:
"In fact, any act which resognizes the case as
in court constitutes a general appearance, and
even in the face of a declared contrary intention,
a general appearance may arise by implication
from the defendant seeking, taking, or agreeing
to some step or proceeding in the cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to the plaintiff,
other than one contesting only the jurisdiction
of the court, . . . "
·
The last quotation also refers to the insignificance
of the label which the defendant attaches to his appearance. Thus, it is of no legal significance that the defendant labels his appearance as being "special" or
"especial". It is the substance of the appearance which
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prevails over the form. U. S. v. Hoerner, supra; Hadden v. Rumsey Products_. supra.
It must be made clear that the waiver contemplated by Rule 12 is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction where none otherwise existed. Personal jurisdiction being merely a privilege, it can be waived. Thus,
personal jurisdiction can be obtained by waiver albeit
no summons was ever issued. Drinkwater v. Drinkwater, Ill F. Supp. 559 (D. Colo. 1953); Emerson v.
National C,ylinder Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 299 (D.
Mass. 1955).
The unfairness of the defendant's position is pointed
out in Savas v. Maria Trading Corp., 285 F. 2d 336
(4th Cir. 1960), where the defendant sought the court's
help on his own behalf and yet resisted the court's
jurisdiction on behalf of his adversary. This position
where the defendant seeks to have his cake and eat it
too is clearly untenable. In calling for mutuality the
court, on page 341, said:
"We think that under these circumstances it
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court
and cannot escape liability through its subsequent jurisdictional exceptions to the cross-libel
of Associated Bulk and to the amended libel of
Savas. Even if it was not validly served with
process it should not be heard to say that the
court had the power to decide in its favor but no
power to render a decree against it. It subjected
itself to the general rule that a litigant who seeks
action by the court without objecting to the
jurisdiction thereby makes a general appearance
and subjects itself to the court's power."
34

POINT THREE
THE ORDER GRANTING SU.l.VIMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
ANACONDA COMPANY IS UNSUPPORTABLE UNDER THE FACTS AND THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT.
Pursuant to the pre-trial Order plaintiffs proceeded to prepare their case for trial against The
Anaconda Company, and the case was set for trial.
Thereupon defendant Anaconda Company made a
motion for summary judgment and claimed that defendant Cox was not acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident so as to impose
liability upon The Anaconda Company. In support
of its position it secured an Affidavit from Cox in
Maryland (R. 134), and submitted it to the local court.
The pertinent statements in the Affidavit are as follows:
"At the time of the accident I was on my way
home to have lunch with mv wife. . . . On a
number of occasions I used ·the car to pick up
laboratory equipment on my way back to my
office. . . . I cannot now recall whether I was
going to pick up equipment after lunch on the
day of the accident ... "
It will be the purpose of plaintiffs to point out
to this Court that the Affidavit, considered with the
entire record in this matter, is insufficient to support
a summary judgment in favor of defendant Anaconda.
l\:Iuch of the information referred to is contained in the
Exhibit packet attached to the record, which contains
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"Statement Regarding Use of Company Cars", Interrogatories to The Anaconda Company, Answers to
Interrogatories, and the published deposition of Roland
l\:Iulchay, assistant chief geologist for The Anaconda
Company.
On the day of the accident defendant Cox was
driving a vehicle owned by defendant Anaconda Company with its express permission ( R. 18, 25) . The
vehicle being driven by Cox was not an ordinary automobile: rather, it was a 1958 Gl\:IC panel truck, similar
to the large vehicles used by survey crews on road
projects and similar activities. At the precise time of
the accident, according to Mr. Cox's Affidavit, he was
going home to lunch.
\Vithout admitting that Cox was on his way home
to lunch, it would seem that the Affidavit, in the absence
of a controverting affidavit or other substantial evidence, would support the defendant to that extent.
However, an examination of the statement in the Affidavit serves no further purpose other than to point out
that Cox on a number of occasions was called upon
to pick up laboratory equipment on his way back to
the office, that he could not recall what he was going
to do with the vehicle on the day of the accident after
getting his lunch other than it was his intent to return
to the office where he was working. With the meager
help furnished by the Affidavit submitted by Cox, we
must now look to the pertinent portions of the record,
namely: Defendant's Answer to the Amended Com36

plaint, Defendant's Answer to the Interrogatories
which have been ndmitted in evidence, the Deposition
of Roland Mulchay, chief geologist for defendant
Anaconda Company in charge of geological work in
the west, and other available pleadings and exhibits.
As is so often the situation in cases involving
agency, evidence relating to agency and the scope of
employment is solely within the control and knowledge
of the defendant company and outside the knowledge
of plaintiff injured by the negligence of an employeedriver. Plaintiffs submit that in this case a presumption
of agency has been created sufficient to present a question of fact for determination by a jury and that the
Affidavit of Cox falls far short of rebutting this presumption. Plaintiffs will now establish that defendant
Anaconda Company benefitted by giving Cox express
permission to use the vehicle at the time the accident
occurred.
At the time of the accident, Cox was a salaried
employee working for Anaconda Company as a geolo
gist ( M ulchay Deposition 3-25) . He worked directly
under :Malcolm Kildale, who was in charge of the Salt
Lake office ( Mulchay Deposition 4-11). Cox spent
time both in the field and in the office, and was driving
a "field" vehicle furnished to geologists for work on
field examinations (Mulchay Deposition 8-11). The
O'eoloaists
did not follow a regular work schedule, and
b
b
might be called on a field trip at any unscheduled time
( Mulchay Deposition 12-28), including a call for an
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immediate field trip at noon or afternoon (l\Iulchay
Deposition 15-25). Therefore, it was for the convenience of the compa11y to permit the geologists to take
these vehicles to and from their homes so that the geologists would have access to a field vehicle upon instant
notice to move to a different project (-Mulchay Deposition 13-26). Anaconda would pay all the gas and oil
and expenses for the operation of the field car at all
times ( l\Iulchay Deposition 14-4) irrespective of where
the men might take the car ( .Mulchay Deposition U13 )-and Anaconda obviously secured all income tax
benefits from expensing such operations against its
earnings. Since the company had numerous interest-;
in the Salt Lake area and in the Park City district,
Bingham Canyon, and other places around the general
perimeter of Salt Lake, it was frequently desirable for
geologists to make short field trips upon instant notice
to see particular developments ( Mulchay Deposition
16-3). It is particularly significant to observe that
Anaconda Company did not permit its employees to
use company vehicles for their personal use (Answer
to Interrogatory No. 27) , nor did they permit employees, and specifically Dennis P. Cox, to have the
use of company vehicles for their own personal use
during lunch time breaks within the regular working
day (Answer to Interrogatory No. 31) , unless it would
facilitate company work ( l\Iulchay Deposition 12-283:
"#31. As of January 5, 1959, was it the policy
of the company to permit Dennis Cox, or other
employees haying similar duties, to have the use
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of company vehicles for their own personal use
during lunch tim breaks within the regular working day?
Answer: No."
From Mr ..Mulchay's Deposition:
Pages 10 and 11:
Q. All right. Assuming that Mr. Cox was actually working in Salt Lake City in the office
at the time of the collision, would Anaconda,
as to Cox and men similarly situated, permit
them to use vehicles to go to and from their
work each day where they were stationed
here in Salt Lake City. If you do not understand, I will back up and take it slower.
A. The use of vehicles in that regard is strictly
in connection with field work, and they were
not supposed to use it on personal business.
Page 12:

*

*

*

A. Well, I believe that my former statement
tells exactly what the policy is. Possibly an
example would serve to illustrate it better.
One of the fellows, John Tombs, a geologist
in the Salt Lake office, left early this morning to go to Bingham to map corps. To facilitate this work, the car was at his house, and
he left early, directly from his house, rather
than coming to the off ice and then going to
the field.

*

*

*

Pages 12 and 13:
A. Because the nature of the work is not subject
to an accurate schedule, he would be able to
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do this to facilitate his work in case that he
must make a field trip at some particular
time, which could not be scheduled.
Page 13:

Q. Under those circumstances, would a man
such as Cox, even though he was working
here in the office in the Kearns Building, be
permitted to use this car, then, in going to
and from his home subject perhaps to call
that he may go somewhere else the next day?
'Vould that be a good illustration or not?
A. Well, I believe it would, yes. But not necessarily for personal convenience.
Page 13:

*

*

*

Pagel4:

Q. Did you feel in any way it served the convenience of the company to have men like
this one you mentioned this morning, or anyone else to have access to these cars so that
if they would be subject to a call to move
to a different project for something of that
sort?
A. That arrangement is made.

Q. And while men would have access to these
cars at times when they might take them, say,
home at night and then go from there whenever directed, would Anaconda pay the gas
and oil and expenses on the operation of the
car?

A. Yes.

*

*
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*

Q. Were these particular cars, from your knowledge, and I am speaking of 1959, right up
until the present, are there ever occasions
when Anaconda furnishes cars to say-geologists and have them, the geologists, pay for
the gas and oil and any upkeep for operational costs ?

A. No.
Page 17:

*

*

*

Q. I see. Do you know whether l\Ir. Cox was a
salaried employee?
A. I believe Mr. Cox was a salaried employee.

*

*

*

As previously pointed out in the answer of defendant Anaconda Company to plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint, it was admitted that Cox had express permission of Anaconda Company to use the field car
at the time the collision occurred. Consequently, considering Mulchay's statements that the vehicles were
used solely for company purposes and not for personal
use, the express perrnission certainly would not have
been given for the use of the vehicle unless in some
manner there was a benefit to Anaconda Company.
The benefit might have been that Cox was to pick up
supplies as was suggested in his Affidavit, or he might
have been called upon immediate notice to proceed
to some location outside the city for company work,
or he might have been called upon for any number of
duties involving his movement with the vehicle which
he had in his possession. In any event, the device of a
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summary judgment in this situation is extremely harsh
and improper.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held it
fundamental that where pleadings filed and representations made to the trial court at a hearing for summary
judgment dispute a moving parties' claim sufficiently
to raise an issue of fact or an inference from those facts
such a motion for summary judgment should be denied.
(Calder v. Siddoway, 330 P.2d 494, 8 Utah 2d 174).
The trial courts should be reluctant to employ such a
drastic remedy as a summary judgment and deprive
litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon trial. (T¥ elchman v. Wood, 337 P. 2d
410, 9 Utah 2d 25; Richards v. Anderson, 337 P. 2d
59, 9 Utah 2d 17) . All doubts should be resolved in
favor of permitting trial and summary judgment should
be granted with reluctance. (I-Ienry v. Washiki, Inc.,
355 P. 2d 973, ll Utah 2d 138). Normally plaintiff must prove agency by inference or implication
rather than by direct evidence since the facts of agency
are entirely at the command of the defendant company.
Plaintiff submits that such inference has been created
by the pleadings and the deposition of Mr. Mulchay
and that this issue should be resolved by a jury.
In the case of TVright v. Intennountain Car Company, 53 Utah 176, 177 P. 237, involving a somewhat
similar case but substantially different on its facts
because on the day involved there was no business transaction of any kind being conducted by the employee
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for his employer and there being no other purpose for
using the car involved except for the social purpose
of dating a young lady, the Utah Supreme Court observed that a moving plaintiff should not be held to a
standard of direct proof of agency:
"Where it appears, as in this case, that the
instrumentality which causes an accident and
injury was, at the time of such accident in the
custody and control of the servant or agent of
the owner of such instrumentality, and the plaintiff is unable to show by direct evidence that
the instrumentality was at the time being used
by the agent or servant within the scope of his
employment and in the master's business, Courts
are usually q11,,ite liberal in permitting the plaintiff to prove facts and circumstances from which
the master's liability may be inferred."
The court further held that where the evidence
is inferential, conflicting or doubtful, it is clearly for
the jury to pass on.
"If the evidence in this case had been inferential or doubtful respecting the purpose for which
the car was being used at the time of the accident,
the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence would have
been proper and would have presented a questionable effect for the jury."
In the case of Larkins v. Utah Copper Company,
127 P.2d 354, an employee of defendant company had
the duty to inspect lumber purchased by the company.
He was subject to a call at any time and could be
sent any place the company wanted to send him. On
the day in question the employee traveled to Bukoda,
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'i\T ashington, completed his work, and was on his way
returning to his own home when an accident occurred.
The Court held that the company benefitted from having the employee return home after having completed
his inspection in order to be available for call to do
other like work. The Court further held that while
the general rule is that one is not within the course of
his employment when going to or from work unless
engaged in the furtherance of his master's business,
the instant case is to be distinguished in that the use
of the automobile was impliedly authorized, that such
method of transportation was reasonably necessary for
the efficient prosecution of the company's business,
and that the employee was subject to call at any time.
Disregarding the pleadings and deposition of
~iulchay, Cox's affidavit is ambiguous and uncertain
concerning his business activity in returning to the
office. In 52 A.L.R. 2d 391, the writer of that annotation speaks upon the subject as follows:
"Where there is evidence that the driver is
combining a business trip or business duties with
a trip after a meal, it has been held that he might
be found to have been acting in the scope of his
employment."
Thereafter, the annatator cites the case of Barz
v. Fleischmann Y cast Company, 308 Mo. 288, 271
S.,i\T. 361, holding that the question of scope of employment should have been suhmitted to the jury, and a
directed verdict for the defendant was reversed where
defendant's shipping clerk took one of its trucks in
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order to go to his noon meal. Defendant's testimony
showed that the driver acted without authority and was
not authorized to drive the truck, but there was evidence
for plaintiff that immediatley after the accident, when
the driver offered to take plaintiff home, he had said
that he had first some deliveries to make. The Court
held this evidence was sufficient to submit to a jury
and the directed verdict was reversed.
Also, where there is evidence justifying the conclusion that the employer received some special business
benefit from the employee's use of the automobile in
going to and from his meals, it has been held that he
might be found to be within the scope of his employment
( 52 A.L.R. 2d 397). The fact that Cox was subject
to call at any time in going to and from his meals indicates a convenience to the company in permitting the
use of the field car.
In 8 Am. J ur 2d, Sec. 629, page 182, the annotator enunciates the folowing rule:

" * * * where an employee is involved in an
accident while proceeding to get a meal in the
course of a business errand undertaken in the
course of his employment, it is generally held
that he has not left the scope of his employment
for the ,reason that this use of the vehicle is a
normal incident of the business errand, or that
the employer derives some special business benefit from this use of his vehicle;"
In summary, the uncontroverted facts reveal that
defendant Anaconda Company was the owner of the
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vehicle involved in the collision; that Cox was defendant
Anaconda's employee on a salary and subject to calls
at all hours; that the defendant company furnished
to Cox a field vehicle and permitted him to take the
field vehicle to his home for the convenience of the
company in order to be available for instant calls to
go to area projects; that it was the company policy
not to give permission for use of vehicles for private
use but only when accompanied by a business use or
convenience of the company; that express permission
was given for the particular trip during which the
accident occurred. The Affidavit of Cox does not deny
the possiblity of a call by the company directing him
to another work project. Also, he could not recall
whether he would pick up equipment after lunch on
his way back to the office. The pleadings and ~Iulchay
deposition, coupled with the admission by defendant
Anaconda Company that Cox had permission to use
the car at the time of the accident, create an inference
of benefit to the company and control of the employee
sufficient to submit this issue to a jury. In Fox v.
Lavender, 56 P.2d, 1049, 109 A.L.R. 109, the Court
held:
"When there is a paucity of facts from which
any inference as to agency or the lack of it can
be had, solution may depend entirely upon presumptions. And these presumption may, in many
cases, not only serve to relieve the plaintiff on
the duty of presenting evidence tending to show
agency, but may have the effect of substantive
law."
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In Higgans v. Deskins, 263 S.W. 108, 52 A.L.R.
2d 346, the Court held that proof of ownership coupled
with evidence of employment create a presumption
of responsible agency which requires the defendant to
take up the burden of evidence and rebut the presumption. The Court stated:
"This rule of practice rests on the view that
the ownership of an automobile implies the right
of possession and control, and the evidence essential to the determination of the question is peculiarly within the owner's knowledge. He knows
whether the machine is being operated by his
employee or agent so as to render the owner
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
while a person injured by the negligence of the
driver ordinarily cannot know and may find it
impossible to prove that he was acting for the
owner within the range of the employee's duty
or authority."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that defendant Cox
has made a personal appearance in this action submitting
him to the Court's jurisdiction, and, in any event,
that in rem jurisdiction as to his liability can be had
through garnishment proceedings in accordance with
the ruling of Judge Jeppson heretofore made in this
matter and that the Order quashing summons should
be set aside and nullified. Further, as to defendant
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Anaconda Company, this matter should be returned
to the Third District Court for a trial on the merits.
GLEN E. FULLER
WILFORD A. BEESLEY
Attorneys for Appellants
15 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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